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Fuller and Arendt: A Happy Marriage? Comment
on Rundle
Thomas Mertens
1 Forms Liberate
In her article on the need to develop a ‘public legal theory through Fuller and
Arendt’, Rundle aims to develop further the theoretical thrust of her important
book Forms Liberate by focusing on a more general question, namely how to
develop a normative legal theory that is distinctively public or political. She aims
to do so primarily by bringing Fuller into conversation with Arendt. In this com-
ment, I want to add some caveats with regard to the viability of this conversation.
Obviously, I am not claiming that Arendt’s work could not or should not be
brought into conversation with Fuller simply because Arendt never claimed to be
a legal scholar. That is not a convincing argument at all. Yet, it is my conjecture
that the position to which Rundle brings us in Forms Liberate leaves perhaps an
insufficient basis for such a conversation. In brief, the gap that divides Arendt
from Fuller in Rundle’s reading might well be too large to bridge. In order to
develop this claim, I shall rely to quite some extent on Rundle’s book. The best
way to start is its well-chosen title, which indicates at least three things.
Firstly, the title indicates the liberation of Fuller’s jurisprudence from the narrow
confines of the debate between Fuller and Hart, in which the latter had been able
to set the jurisprudential agenda to the detriment of the former. Framing Fuller’s
position within this debate enabled Hart to interpret the eight criteria of what
Fuller famously called the internal morality of the law in a merely instrumental
way as compatible with a positivist outlook on law. According to Hart, law could
be efficacious only if these eight requirements were observed. Consequently,
there was nothing specifically ‘moral’ about them. Forms Liberate explicitly rejects
such a distorted, ‘checklist’ reading of the eight requirements. Therefore, Fuller’s
jurisprudence had to be ‘reclaimed’ as an entirely different perspective on law
– one which does not depart from a conception of political sovereignty from
which subsequently legal commands or rules emanate. According to Fuller, Hart’s
concept of law, important as it may be, does not significantly differ from that of
Austin.1 Whereas the positivist outlook basically conceives of law as a vertical
enterprise,2 Fuller understands law according to Rundle as an intrinsically moral
phenomenon and as ‘a distinctive mode of governance,’ which presupposes the
legal subject’s status as a responsible agent. The eight criteria are then needed to
1 Kristen Rundle, Forms Liberate. Reclaiming the Jurisprudence of Lon L Fuller (Oxford: Hart Publish-
ing, 2012), 94.
2 Rundle, Forms Liberate, 129.
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establish and uphold the meaningful relationship between law and responsible
human agency.3
This leads to the second meaning of Forms Liberate. Rundle ascribes to Fuller a
view of law as a means for establishing human societies that are ruled in a way
that respects the human agency of its members. Obviously, human societies can
also be ruled, as is often the case, in a managerial way by men. Thus, according to
Fuller, the rule of law is ‘a formally recognizable alternative to the rule of men.’
Whereas the latter indicates the mode of a managerial direction whose subjects
are conceived as, in Rundle’s words, ‘a subservient populace ready to do what they
are told to do,’ the former points at a social condition in which a person is respec-
ted as ‘a responsible agent.’4 In other words, law’s forms liberate in the sense that
they establish according to Fuller a meaningful relationship between law and
human agency. Law should not be associated, as is the case in the positivist
approach, with a managerial approach to society and a top-down, vertical rela-
tionship between lawgiver and legal subjects. In line with its ‘idealistic tenor,’5
Rundle understands Fuller’s approach to law as requiring – or perhaps better: pre-
supposing – a horizontal relationship of reciprocity between lawgiver and legal
subjects. This then is the meaning of ‘the internal morality of law,’ Fuller’s central
contribution to legal theory: in order for legal rules to be created and adminis-
tered in a manner that respects the human agency of the legal subjects, they must
be general, promulgated, clear, non-contradictory, non-retroactive etc. If the law
does not meet these requirements, it violates human agency and belongs to what
Fuller, in Rundle’s words, called ‘legal pathology.’6 It is therefore wrong to under-
stand these criteria, as Hart did, as non-moral requirements for the efficacy of
law. Instead, they are per excellence the moral requirements of making and
upholding the distinct way of governing human societies that is properly called
‘law.’
In a third and final sense, Forms Liberate forms a plea for another kind of legal
scholarship that liberates itself ‘from its preoccupation with source-based
imperative theories and their instrumentalist commitments,’ i.e. from the need
to identify rules as ‘legal’ rules ‘by reference to some source-based test,’7 either in
the form of a sovereign will or in the form of a supposedly natural law.8 According
to Rundle, legal scholarship must move away from the deadlock of the source ori-
ented, ‘top-down oriented’ and ‘unidirectional’9 debate between positivism and
non-positivism and instead focus on how law arises out of ‘reciprocal’10 relation-
ships both among citizens themselves and between lawgivers and their legal
subjects. As the eight criteria give expression to the idea of human agency, they
3 Rundle, Forms Liberate, 2-3.
4 Rundle, Forms Liberate, 139.
5 Rundle, Forms Liberate, 4.
6 Rundle, Forms Liberate, 81, 94.
7 Rundle, Forms Liberate, 49, 77, 119.
8 See, e.g., Rundle, Forms Liberate, 31, 44.
9 Rundle, Forms Liberate, 122, 125.
10 Rundle, Forms Liberate, 89, 122.
280 Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy 2014 (43) 3
Dit artikel uit Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy is gepubliceerd door Boom Juridische uitgevers en is bestemd voor Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen 59665+65441
Fuller and Arendt: A Happy Marriage? Comment on Rundle
provide the necessary starting position to establish a jurisprudence that is radi-
cally distinct from the view that law has essentially ‘a pyramidal structure.’11
2 Fuller’s society
Fuller’s jurisprudence has thus been reclaimed against Hart’s efforts to integrate
the eight principles into a positivist account of the law, and an alternative picture
arises of a society whose subjects are not acted upon but treated as responsible
agents, i.e. governed through law.12 This society is supposedly held together by
laws and regulations that stem from reciprocal relationships between lawgivers
and legal subjects – relationships characterized by concepts such as trusteeship,
dialogue, respect and dignity.
This all sounds admirable and worth pursuing, but also quite utopian. A Fullerian
society seems far removed from the everyday, ‘empirical’ life of the law in our
societies, in which positive law is the result of and characterized by political strug-
gles. It thus seems as if Fuller’s ‘idealistic’ conception of law as enabling and guar-
anteeing agency indeed needs to be complemented by a political dimension: how
to acknowledge and deal with the fact that law is so related to political power that
it makes its association with ‘coercion and sanctions’13 so convincing. This then
must be Rundle’s direction forward: a view of politics that is not centred on sover-
eignty as the source of law structured as a pyramid, but around human agency as
in Fuller’s view of law. I presume that this has led Rundle to Arendt’s political phi-
losophy; Arendt’s work can provide inspiration for how to establish and to uphold
such dialogical relationships between lawgivers and legal subjects.
And there seem to be good reasons for bringing Fuller together with Arendt. Both
authors defend rather unorthodox approaches: Fuller does not fit into the domi-
nant jurisprudential distinction between positivism and non-positivism. Arendt
also does not fit into any common political scheme: neither into the liberal-
communitarian distinction, nor into the simple division between political right or
left. Both Fuller and Arendt hold independent positions within law and political
philosophy respectively, with similar shortcomings: Fuller’s focus on law seems to
neglect its political dimension, whereas Arendt’s political analyses seem to under-
estimate the importance of law. Therefore Fuller and Arendt seem to complement
each other: why not tease out their common interest in the legal subject and the
juridical person respectively?
In examining the extent to which such a conversation can be fruitful, we can per-
haps start with the fact that Forms Liberate acknowledges that no rigid opposition
exists between the rule of law with its recognition of human agency on the one
hand and managerial direction addressed at subservient populations on the
11 Rundle, Forms Liberate, 93.
12 Rundle, Forms Liberate, 98-99.
13 Rundle, Forms Liberate, 94.
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other.14 The difference between the two forms of governance, the rule of law and
legal pathologies, is often a matter of degree. Yet, it is not fully clear what are the
political conditions under which societies can move away from ‘managerial
direction’ to the ‘rule of law’ (or vice versa), and whether the rule of law sets con-
straints on the kind of purposes societies can attain, including the type of purpo-
ses that are excluded.
If Fuller’s jurisprudence does indeed lack a substantial political element, this is
how to understand Rundle when she writes that his conception of the person
should not be understood as prior to the law, but rather as something that ‘arises
because of law.’15 Fuller’s understanding of the legal subject should thus be under-
stood in connection with a particular surrounding legal and political order.16 This
is perhaps best illustrated by Fuller’s story of the tyrant. According to Forms Lib-
erate, the tale of the tyrant who uses his subjects as tools but inadvertently must
accord them some agency, suggests that tyrannical forms of managerial direction
inevitably and inadvertently lead to legal forms and thus to agency. Tyrants may
aim only to use society for their own ends, but they must inevitably make use of
‘legal forms’ by means of which the tyrant’s subjects gradually become liberated
from his tyranny and develop agency. Despite the tyrant’s explicit aims, legal
forms defeat him as a tyrant.17 But if that is the case, than it would seem that the
forms of law themselves are sufficient to liberate subjects from managerial direc-
tion and bestow upon them ‘agency.’ Why is Arendt still needed? Is the tale of the
tyrant not convincing after all or is the use of legal forms alone not enough to
defeat tyranny and to establish the rule of law that fully recognizes human
agency?
3 Arendt and the law
In her paper, Rundle rightly stresses Arendt’s interest in the juridical person and
in human agency in general. According to Arendt, there is hardly anything more
important in human life than being recognized as a juridical person; Arendt con-
ceives of the right to have rights as the single most important human right.18
Without this right, human beings are cut off from the political world and become
the objects of, in Fuller’s words, arbitrary ‘managerial direction,’ living at the dis-
cretion of the powers that be. One could indeed argue that being recognized as a
juridical person is for Arendt the precondition for human agency. Rundle refers to
the crucial distinction within the concentration camps between ‘the criminals’
and ‘the politicals’ which hinges on the fact that the former were locked up for
14 Rundle, Forms Liberate, 137.
15 Kristen Rundle, ‘Legal Subjects and Juridical Persons: Developing Public Legal Theory through
Fuller and Arendt,’ this volume, 222 (italics hers).
16 Rundle, ‘Legal Subjects and Juridical Persons,’ 214.
17 Rundle, Forms Liberate, 109.
18 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (London: Harcourt Brace, 1958), 290-302.
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what they had done and the latter for who they were. The agency of the former
was still acknowledged, while the agency of the latter completely denied.
In Rundle’s view, Arendt’s reluctance to engage with law and legal theory is the
result of her interest in developing an alternative account of law. Both Fuller and
Arendt are said to put forward ‘strident critiques of the command theory of
law.’19 Therefore, it seems safe to suppose, according to Rundle, that Arendt also
rejects any source-based account of the law. Rundle attributes to Arendt the view
that law and its institutional forms (should) constitute ‘a distinctive species of
personhood vis-à-vis political power.’20 According to Rundle’s reading of Arendt, a
person should indeed never become merely an instrument of political power, but
should always sustain its legal status as a person.
Nonetheless, the question must be asked as to whether Arendt conceives of per-
sonhood as somehow entailed or implied in the concept of ‘law,’ as seems to be
the case in Fuller; or whether personhood is for Arendt a moral requirement to
the law, inspired by her republican approach to politics. As this requirement is
often not met, her contemporary political landscape (and ours) consisted of
nation-states with an exclusive power to decide who belongs and who not. In
other words, whether Fullerian views can be brought into conversation with
Arendt, depends to a large extent on what conception of law and political person
emerges from the texts in which Arendt engages most explicitly with law and
legal theory.
Rundle presents us with some forceful examples of how Arendt can indeed be
read fruitfully from a Fullerian perspective. Yet, there is also a forceful counter-
example and it is Arendt’s most ‘legal’ treatise: her report on the Eichmann trial.
It is remarkable that Rundle does not confront her interpretation of Fuller with
this text, for here, Arendt deals explicitly with questions concerning both the rule
of law and the source of the law, i.e. the law on which the jurisdiction of the
Jerusalem court could be based. Study of this text suggests that Arendt’s views fit
badly with the way Rundle in which conceives of law in opposition to managerial
direction. In her report on the Eichmann trial, Arendt not only explicitly affirms
the legitimacy of the trial and its outcome – conviction and execution – but she
also accepts the violations, at least formally, of the rule of law. This seems incom-
patible with Fuller who forcefully wrote: ‘every departure from the principles of
law’s inner morality is an affront to man’s dignity. To judge his actions by
unpublished or retrospective laws (…) is to convey to him your indifference to his
powers of self-determination.’21
19 Rundle, ‘Legal Subjects and Juridical Persons,’ 216.
20 Rundle, ‘Legal Subjects and Juridical Persons,’ 218.
21 Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (revised edition) (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969),
162.
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This point cannot be fully elaborated here.22 However, even a quick glance at
Arendt’s report shows that she was (1) not particularly worried by the trial’s vio-
lation of the rule of law and (2) that she was interested in the source of the
Jerusalem’s jurisdiction. Starting with the last element: Arendt took a keen
interest in the legal discussions concerning the authority of the law under which
Eichmann was tried, convicted and punished. In defence of the jurisdiction of the
Jerusalem court, some had argued in favour of the ‘passive personality’ principle.
Arendt rejected this basis because it would bring the trial too close to the perspec-
tive of harm done to the victims, whereas a criminal trial should, as she saw it,
revolve around the question of whether the accused had violated a legal norm.
Arendt also rejected ‘universal jurisdiction’ as the source of the legitimacy of the
court: ‘universal jurisdiction’ had been granted in relation to the crime of piracy
because that crime took place on the open sea, where the territoriality principle
could not apply. For Arendt, since Eichmann’s crimes had taken place on a spe-
cific territory, namely where the Jews resided, the correct answer to the question
of the jurisdiction of the court should lie in the principle of ‘territoriality,’ even if
the ‘residents’ of this territory could not claim citizenship of their own state. In
other words, although the State of Israel was established only later, it could legiti-
mately claim jurisdiction ex post. The fact that the State of Israel did not have a
territory when Eichmann committed his crimes because it did not yet exist, does
not bar its jurisdiction.
The importance for our purposes here is not whether Arendt’s ‘solution’ to the
problem of the jurisdiction of the Jerusalem court is correct or convincing, but
the fact that she finds it important to indicate the legal source for this jurisdic-
tion and that she is not concerned that this might be seen as a possible violation
of the rule of law. The argument that the whole trial was a sham trial and a viola-
tion of the rule of law was made by the defence, but Arendt was not impressed.
For her, the Eichmann trial was not just politics with invented legal means, but it
was law indeed, because the State of Israel had the right to prosecute Eichmann.
In relation to the first element, we find that Arendt attributes authority to the
Jerusalem law, even if it violates formal requirements of the rule of law. This is
relevant because Rundle stresses Fuller’s words that ‘every departure from the
principles of law’s inner morality is an affront to man’s dignity as a responsible
agent.’23 It was argued on Eichmann’s behalf that not only the prosecuting State
of Israel, but also the law itself under which Eichmann was tried (the 1950 Israeli
‘Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Act’), was being applied to him retro-
actively, so that the trial would testify of, in Fuller’s words, ‘indifference to his
[Eichmann’s] powers of self-determination.’ Arendt, however, famously argued
that the prohibition of non-retroactive legislation has validity only with regard to
crimes that the legislator could reasonably have foreseen. In her view, it would be
absurd to argue that the unprecedented crime of the Holocaust could not be pun-
22 See, e.g., Thomas Mertens, ‘The Eichmann Trial: Hannah Arendt’s View on the Jerusalem Court’s
Competence,’ German Law Journal 6 (2005), 407-24.
23 Rundle, Forms Liberate, 97.
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ished because it was an entirely new crime, and thus not foreseen by any
legislator. She held that the demands of material justice cannot be set aside out of
deference for formal considerations of temporality and retroactivity. The intro-
duction of this new, retroactive law was justified, according to Arendt, even if it
were to be construed as a violation of Eichmann’s agency.
This leads to the final element which makes it difficult to unite Fuller’s view of
law with Arendt’s interpretation of the Eichmann report. There has been ample
debate on Arendt’s portrayal of Eichmann as a banal person who did not realize
what he was doing. There is sufficient evidence today that Eichmann was not a
mere civil servant, but that he held strong anti-Semitic convictions and that he
knew very well what he was doing.24 Arendt may thus have been wrong in arguing
that Eichmann lacked mens rea, i.e. that he committed his crimes under circum-
stances that made it ‘well-nigh impossible for him to know or to feel that he was
doing wrong.’25 Yet, it is not always fully appreciated that Arendt wholeheartedly
supported Eichmann’s conviction and the death penalty despite her assessment of
his lack of intentionality. Apparently, Eichmann’s intentions and motivations
– his supposed lack of ‘agency’ – was irrelevant to Arendt. Instead, what was
crucial was Eichmann’s central role in this great crime. According to Arendt, the
Holocaust was an offence against nature, in which the earth cried out for
revenge.26 For Arendt, Eichmann deserved to die because the law of nature so
demanded it. The prohibition on retroactive criminal legislation could not shield
the punishment of acts that were clearly and evidently, by nature,27 criminal.
Rundle’s attempt to bring Arendt to the aid of Fuller in challenging the command
theory of law opens interesting vistas, but also faces serious challenges. In her
report of the Eichmann trial, Arendt relies on a conception of law that profoundly
differs from Fuller’s. She acknowledges that the prevailing criminal laws leave us
rather empty-handed when dealing with the new crimes against humanity, but
these crimes must nonetheless be punished, even if adjudicating them means vio-
lating the internal morality of the law.
4 Radbruch
If Fuller and Arendt do not make an ideal couple, where can we go from here? I
want to end this comment with a suggestion for a direction that Rundle may wish
to explore: rather than pairing Fuller with Arendt, it may be more fruitful to con-
nect Arendt’s views with the legal philosophy of Gustav Radbruch, the well-
known German philosopher whose response to certain post-war cases formed
24 David Cesarani, Eichmann. His Life and Crimes (London: Vintage, 2005); Bettina Stangneth, Eich-
mann vor Jerusalem: Das unbehelligte Leben eines Massenmörders (Zürich/Hamburg: Reinbek,
2011).
25 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem. A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: Penguin, 1994
(1963)), 276.
26 Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, 277.
27 Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, 277.
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part of the debate between Fuller and Hart. Elsewhere I have argued that Fuller
certainly had the better argument in relation to Radbruch’s famous post-war
essays because he, and not Hart, clearly understood what was at stake.28 I wish to
suggest that, in regard to the Eichmann trial, Arendt’s position is better illumina-
ted by Radbruch, who famously defended that claims of legal certainty – and thus
of human agency – should be set aside in extreme cases if the demands of (crimi-
nal) justice so require.
Radbruch presents us with a rich philosophy of law. His central ‘idea of law’
includes not only, under the heading of legal certainty, the formal criteria of law-
making that Fuller emphasizes, but also the substantive criteria of ‘justice’ and
‘purposiveness.’ As a result of this last component, the realm of competing ethical
and political values forms part of ‘the idea of law.’ Radbruch is well aware that law
does not function within a political vacuum; it is always (also) a means, an instru-
ment by which (groups of) legal subjects aim to realise particular values. For
some, the ultimate value may reside in the greatest possible freedom for each
individual member of society, while for others it exists in the well-being of society
as a whole. By acknowledging ‘purposiveness’ as part of the ‘idea of law,’
Radbruch succeeds in understanding law as resulting from the political struggle
between opposing groups with different views on what values and purposes
should be promoted by society. Because legal certainty is another important ele-
ment of the ‘idea of law,’ these values and purposes can only be achieved legally
when human agency is respected.29
In his post-war essays, Radbruch criticizes so-called Nazi-legality, but not only as
is often said because of its clear violation of ‘justice as equality,’ but also because
of its violation of legal certainty. Indeed, according to Radbruch’s formula, legal
certainty can sometimes be set aside in favour of justice. However, the impor-
tance that Radbruch, as Fuller, attributes to legal certainty and human agency
should not be overlooked. At the end of his most famous post-war essay,
Radbruch insists on the importance of legal certainty, writing that ‘we must seek
justice, but at the same time attend to legal certainty, for it is a component of jus-
tice.’30 Legal certainty, with its emphasis on forms, sets clear limits to how soci-
etal purposes and values can be reached legally.
Radbruch did not conceive of law, as Fuller did, as a dialogue between lawgiver
and legal subjects. For Radbruch, law cannot be isolated from the political because
its material content is derived from politics. ‘Managerial direction’ can therefore
not be isolated from the life of the law. It is not easy to find ways in which to
28 Thomas Mertens, ‘Radbruch and Hart on the Grudge Informer: A Reconsideration,’ Ratio Juris 15
(2002), 186-205.
29 See, e.g., Gustav Radbruch, Rechtsphilosophie (ed. Erik Wolf) (Stuttgart: K. F.Koehler, 1970
(1932)), Par. 9, 168-73.
30 Gustav Radbruch, ‘Gesetzliches Unrecht und Űbergesetzliches Recht (1946),’ in Radbruch,
Rechtsphilosophie, 357; translated as: Gustav Radbruch, ‘Statutory Lawlessness and Supra-Statu-
tory Law,’ trans. Bonnie Litschewski Paulson and Stanley L. Paulson, Oxford Journal of Legal Stud-
ies 6 (2006), 11.
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harmonize the claims of law and of politics, and Radbruch even used the concept
of antinomy to characterize their relationship. However, he attempted to provide
some guidance to understanding it: whereas law itself cannot decide which
societal values and purposes should be promoted, it sets constraints on how these
purposes should be realized, namely only by respecting the claims of legal cer-
tainty. The law should also, according to Radbruch, determine the process by
which societal purposes are selected. Since neither science nor philosophy can
decide on the truth of the values or purposes presented in the political arena – in
this respect, Radbruch is a relativist – it should be the democratic process that
ultimately determines the outcome of the political struggle. Rather than develop-
ing a political perspective that complements the legal forms, as Rundle suggests,
Radbruch presents us with an ‘idea of law’ that aims to give both the legal and
political perspective its legitimate limited place. This sounds very much like
Arendt’s analysis of the Eichmann trial from both the political and the legal per-
spective.
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